Krispy Kreme Enterprise Agreement
If you searched and you can not find agreement: 2.37 The result was very different. Individual contracts have not been used to facilitate mutually profitable jobs. Instead, they have been used to eliminate rewards and reduce wages and conditions of employment. THE 1996, 1999 and 2002 ACIRRT reports on the effects of ICA provided concrete evidence that the system that promoted collective agreements did not provide a fair and equitable safety net for wages and conditions. The first two reports were commissioned by the Trades and Labour Council of Western Australia (UnionsWA).  The reports have established that most individual agreements do not provide penalty interest for weekend work, leave or overtime, preventing the formal continuation of complaints and the use by employers for standard negotiations.  The 1996 report concluded that “deregulation can only lead to a reduction in the responsibility to regulate wages and working conditions, not to the development of dynamic and innovative agreements that meet the specific needs of the various parties involved.”  “Howard WorkChoices zombie chords still exist and continue to harm workers. Krispy Kreme exploited workers and this zombie deal gave American owners an undeserved commercial advantage. 2.36 The effects of labour relations changes introduced in New Zealand were rapidly felt in Australia.
Within six weeks of their election in 1992, the Kennett government passed an Employment Relations Act in Victoria that effectively abolished bonuses for many workers and replaced them with individual contracts. Similarly, the Court government introduced individual employment contracts (IWA) registered under the Workplace Agreements Act of 1993 in Western Australia. The proposal by the Western Australian government indicates that, under a system of “minimalist employment contracts,” many government workers might think that implementing individual agreements would eliminate the influence of rewards and unions and automatically increase their success.  2.47 On a more fundamental level, the Committee is concerned about the lack of effective means for workers who have been forced to sign an AWA. It has been shown to the committee that the application of the anti-Duress provisions is virtually non-existent. The anti-coercive provisions of the Eastern COMMERCE Act appear to be inaccessible to most workers. Under the law, workers have the right to address the issue of coercion and persecution of an employer by the courts. Yet, according to the legislation, even successful prosecutions do not overturn a signed agreement, which is the most likely reason why very few charges of coercion have been brought before the courts.
Employees can address the problem of the OAS constraint, which has the authority to review whether an AWA has been approved or not. The Commission is not aware of any evidence that the OAS pursues alleged cases of coercion with a conviction, if at all.  … It is by no means clear that the reform agenda is a program that is particularly interested in promoting collective agreements. The government has looked at the low coverage of A.A.s and therefore intends to do so,… to promote the interest of employers in them. But what if AWAs are not desired by workers? At present, there does not appear to be any measures to ensure that workers can choose between individual and collective agreements.